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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to § 78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Whether the trial court, in granting summary judgment

for Appellees, correctly concluded that Appellant failed to raise
a material issue of fact sufficient to prevent the trial court
from ruling as a matter of law as per the specific trust language
that the interests vested in Appellees by virtue of the 1992
Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust were subject only to
divestiture via a revocation of that trust.

Conclusions of the

trial court with respect to summary judgment are reviewed by the
appellate court for correctness.

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813

P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the trial court could have correctly concluded

that, even when considering the facts in the light most favorable
to Appellant, the documents allegedly executed in 1999 by Betty
Banks were insufficient to either effect the revocation of the
1992 Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust or amend that trust
as a matter of law.

An appellate court may affirm a trial

court' s order granting summary judgment on any ground that was
available to the trial court even if it was not specifically
relied upon by the court below.
P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) .

Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855

This issue was presented to the trial

court and is preserved by the record.
3.

(R.3 75-76).

Whether the trial court, in denying Appellant's Motion

for Summary Judgment, correctly concluded that Appellees had

submitted evidence that, when taken in the light most favorable
to them as the nonmoving party, was sufficient to raise an issue
of material fact as to whether Ms. Banks was either competent or
free from undue influence when she allegedly executed certain
documents in 1999.

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for

summary judgment is not appealable.
Exch., 443 P.2d 385 (Utah 1968).

Christensen v. Farmers Ins.

However, cross-motions for

summary judgment may be viewed as the independent contention by
both parties that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law rather than a concession that no question of fact exists
under the theory advanced by the opposing party.

Wycalis v.

Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).

Nonmoving parties are entitled to have all

evidence construed in the light most favorable to their position.
Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).
4.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that the

statements made by attorney Joseph Piatt were admissible when the
information divulged by Mr. Piatt was not acquired by him in his
capacity as Appellant' s attorney and it was divulged by him only
in response to specific questions posed Appellant's counsel.

A

trial court' s interpretation of law is reviewed for correctness
with some deference being accorded the trial court' s application
of law to fact.

Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah

App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Cases:
Contintental Bank & Trust v. Country Club Mobile Est.,
632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981) (even revocable trusts vest within trust
2

beneficiaries an enforceable interest in the trust corpus).
Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993) (when
interpreting a contract a court must construe the writing
according to its plain and ordinary meaning).
Nielsen v. 0' Reillv. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) (a
contract should be read as a whole in an attempt to harmonize and
give effect to all of the contract' s provisions).
In re Short, 7 S.W.3d (Mo. App. 1999) (well known
technical terms should be afforded their technical meanings).
Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah
1979) (nonmoving parties are entitled to have all questions of
fact resolved in their favor).
Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 (Utah 1988) (the
presence of undue influence is a question of fact).
Hilbert v. Benson, 916 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1996) (the test
for competency is whether the settlor had the ability to
comprehend the subject of the trust, its nature and probable
consequences).
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731
P.2d 483 (Utah 1988) (only complete and facially unambiguous
documents may be interpreted as a matter of law).
Gold Standard Inc. v. American Barrick Resource Corp.,
801 P.2d 909 (Utah 1990) (the attorney-client privilege must be
strictly construed).
Rules of Evidence:

Utah R. Evid 507(a).

Rules of Civil Procedure:

Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56

Statutes: Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-8(2).
Restatements: Restatement 2d, Trusts §§ 19, 333 (the test for
competency is whether the settlor had the ability to comprehend
the subject of the trust, its nature and probable consequences).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.
The dispute in the present case focuses on issues which

surround the 1999 modification of the 1992 document entitled "The
3

Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust."

Appellees are the

children and vested beneficiaries of the 1992 Trust.

Appellant

is the vested beneficiary of the 1999 modification of that trust
which purports to divest Appellees of their beneficial interests.
As set forth above, this appeal presents four issues for the
Court to determine.

However, the Court's decision will hinge on

the Court' s interpretation of the specific language of the 1992
trust document.

If the Court finds, as the trial court found, as

per the specific language of section 3.2 of the trust document
that the children' s beneficial interests in the trust corpus were
subject to divestiture only through the revocation of the trust,
then this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court
below.

If, however, the Court finds that the children' s

interests were subject to divestiture via a modification or
amendment to the trust, the Court should remand this case to the
trial court to determine whether the 1999 modification of trust
was effected while Ms. Banks was competent and free from undue
influence.
The remaining issue focuses on the statements made by
attorney Joseph Piatt in his deposition and in an affidavit
offered by Appellees in support of their motion for summary
judgment and in opposition to Appellant' s cross-motion.
Appellant contends that these statements were improperly admitted
by virtue of the attorney-client privilege while Appellees
contend that even if the statements were privileged they were
properly admitted on account of the nature of the underlying case
4

and the fact that Appellant waived the privilege by eliciting the
responses from Mr. Piatt during his deposition.
B.

Course of proceedings.
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Appellees agree that Appellant has accurately
characterized the course of proceedings.
C.

Disposition of the trial court.
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Appellees agree that Appellant has accurately
characterized the disposition of the trial court.
D.

Statement of the facts.

1.

Appellees are the children of the decedent, Betty A. Banks,

who passed away on August 24, 1999.

(R.15, 156).

2.

Appellant is the older sister of the decedent.

(R.155).

3.

Attorney Joseph Piatt is the attorney who prepared

testamentary instruments for both the decedent and Appellant in
or about April of 1992.
4.

(R.388).

Third-party Kevin Reeves is the Appellant's confidant and

the beneficiary of Appellant's estate.

(R.363, citing Deposition

of Nancy Means, p. 42.12, and Deposition of Joseph Piatt, p.
69.4).

For the sake of candor, Appellant contends that Mr.

Piatt' s statement concerning Mr. Reeves' status as the
beneficiary of Appellant' s estate violated attorney-client
privilege.
5.

The trial court admitted this statement.

In April of 1992, the decedent executed a document known as

"The Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust," hereinafter
5

referred to as "the 1992 trust."
6.

(R.363).

Article I of that document states: "This Trust is

established for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the
Undersigned' s lifetime, for the Undersigned' s family thereafter."
Article I then proceeds to list the names of the Appellees as the
only family of the Undersigned.
7.

(R.2-3).

Under the terms of the 1992 trust, the decedent, as the

settlor and trustee, retained the right to enjoy the use of the
trust corpus as she saw fit until the time of her death with her
children being named as vested beneficiaries subject to
divestiture.
8.

(R.363).

The 1992 trust also specified that Appellees were to serve

as joint successor trustees following the Undersigned* s death or
incapacity.
9

(R.363).

Section 3.2 of the 1992 trust reads:
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to
divestiture which shall continue until this Trust is revoked
or terminated other than by death. As long as this trust
subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by
the Trustee named herein in their fiduciary capacity. (R.
363) .

10.

Section 3.1 of the 1992 trust reads:
Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is
alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify
or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from
such principal. Such revocation or amendment of this Trust
may be in whole or in part by written instrument.
Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument
shall be effective only when such change is delivered in
writing to the then acting Trustee. On the revocation of
this instrument in its e entirety, the Trust shall deliver
to the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the
6

instrument of revocation, all of the Trust property.
(R.212).
11.

At no point in time subsequent to the execution of the 1992

trust did the decedent have a falling out with the beneficiaries
of that trust.
12.

(R.363).

In fact, notwithstanding that each of Appellees resided

outside of the State of Utah, Appellees each made consistent
efforts to visit and call the decedent until the time of her
death in August of 1999.

(R.363).

In fact, Appellant has

conceded that the decedent maintained warm relations with her
children until the time of her passing.

Brief of the Appellant,

p.6.6.
13.

In early 1999, the decedent began experiencing a

deterioration of her health that eventually required extended
hospitalization.
14.

(R.361).

At substantially that same time in early 1999, Appellant,

together with Kevin Reeves, began to inquire of the decedent
exactly how she had devised her estate.
15.

(R.361).

In response to these inquiries, the decedent gave answers to

Appellant and Mr. Reeves that did not accurately reflect

her

then current estate plans: she informed them that Appellant was
the beneficiary of the trust which she executed in 1992.
Deposition of Kevin Reeves, p. 19.18-20.18,
16.

(R.369).

Not satisfied with the decedent's response to his inquiry,

Mr. Reeves took it upon himself to search for the decedent' s
estate plans so that he might ascertain for himself whether the
decedent had in fact, devised her estate to Appellant.
7

(R.364).

17.

In February of 1999, at substantially the same time when

Appellant and Mr. Reeves began searching for the decedent1 s
estate plans, the decedent, concealing this fact from Appellant
and Mr. Reeves, gave the original 1992 trust and will to Appellee
Susan Banks for safekeeping together with the instructions that
Ms. Banks would need those documents upon the decedent's passing.
(R.364) .
18.

When Mr. Reeves was unable to locate the documents at issue,

Mr. Reeves persisted in calling attorney Joseph Piatt
approximately twenty times with the goal of obtaining a copy of
the 1992 estate documents so that he would be able to ascertain
for himself

whether the decedent had in fact devised her estate

to Appellant as she had previously represented.
19.

(R.3 64).

Mr. Reeves and Mr. Piatt offer significantly different

versions of the events which culminated in the 1999 amendment to
the 1992 trust.
20.

(R.364).

According to Mr. Reeves, after he had tried approximately

twenty times to reach Mr. Piatt by phone, Mr. Piatt finally
returned Mr. Reeves' phone call.
a.

(R.364).

During this initial phone conversation, Mr. Reeves gave

the telephone to the decedent who then informed Mr. Piatt that
she wished to obtain a copy of her estate planning documents.
(R.364) .
b.

Thereafter, Mr. Reeves obtained the documents at issue

from Mr. Piatt.
c.

(R.364).

Upon obtaining the documents from Mr. Piatt, Mr. Reeves

8

proceeded to read the documents to the decedent, who by this time
was hospitalized for her progressing illness.
d.

(R.364).

After hearing Mr. Reeves1 recital in which Appellees

rather than Appellant stood to take the decedent1 s estate upon
her passing, the decedent allegedly informed Mr. Reeves that the
documents did not reflect either her current or past intentions
and that she instead wished for Appellant to receive her entire
estate.
e.

(R.364).
Mr. Reeves, upon hearing the decedent express her

wishes as such, persisted in calling Mr. Piatt to prevail upon
him the necessity of coming to the hospital to visit with the
decedent so that she could personally express to Mr. Piatt her
desire to amend her estate plans.
f.

(R.365).

After breaking many appointments to meet with the

decedent, Mr. Piatt finally showed up one day, unannounced, at
the decedent' s hospital room while Mr. Reeves happened to be
present.
g.

(R.365).
Prior to this meeting, Mr. Reeves claims to have never

met Mr. Piatt.
h.

(R.365).

During the meeting at the hospital room, Mr. Piatt and

the decedent discussed which changes the decedent wished to make
to her to her estate plans.
I.

(R.365).

Mr. Reeves claims to have been present during the

entire meeting that day and to have overheard the entire
conversation day between Mr. Piatt and the decedent, including
the instructions which the decedent gave Mr. Piatt.
9

(R.365).

j.

During the conversation between Mr. Piatt and the

decedent, Mr. Reeves claims to have witnessed Mr. Piatt make
notations on a pad of paper which he subsequently had the
decedent sign.

When Mr. Reeves questioned Mr. Piatt about the

signed notation, Mr. Piatt allegedly answered that the signed
notation was sufficient to effect the amendment of the 1992 trust
and the no further signature from the decedent would be required.
(R.365).
k.

Unsatisfied with Mr. Piatt' s response, Mr. Reeves

prevailed upon Mr. Piatt to generate more substantial documents
for the decedent to sign.
1.

(R.365).

Thereafter, Mr. Reeves appeared at Mr. Piatt's office

to retrieve the proposed amendments in printed form, and
notwithstanding Mr. Piatt' s statement that the documents required
no additional signature from the decedent, Mr. Reeves took the
documents to Ms. Banks for her signature.
m.

(R.365).

After the decedent signed the documents which Mr.

Reeves had delivered to her, Mr. Reeves returned the documents to
Mr. Piatt who promptly notarized a signature that he had not
witnessed.
21.

(R.365).

Mr. Piatt offers the following version the events:
a.

In the late summer of 1999, Mr. Piatt began receiving

telephone messages from an individual who represented himself to
be Kevin Reeves and that he spoke for the decedent who wished to
make amendments to her then existing estate plans.

Mr. Piatt

denies speaking to the decedent by telephone on that day.
10

(R.

365-66).
b.

Because Mr. Piatt did not know whether Mr. Reeves did

in fact speak for the decedent, Mr. Piatt did not immediately
begin preparing a new set of trust documents, or any amendment
thereto, which reflected the requested changes or amendments.
(R.366).
c.

At some point in time subsequent to their initial

conversation, Mr. Piatt states that Mr. Reeves showed up at his
office unannounced and that Mr. Reeves stated that he would not
leave until he received a satisfactory resolution to the matter.
(R. 366) .
d.

At that time, Mr. Piatt prepared a handwritten note

stating that the decedent wished to make changes in her estate
plans with respect to the existing beneficiaries.

Mr. Piatt gave

this note to Mr. Reeves with the instruction that Mr. Reeves
should deliver the note to the decedent, have the decedent sign
the note and then return the note to his office as evidence of
the decedent's desire to actually change her trust.
e.

Mr. Reeves subsequently returned with the signed note

purporting to bear the decedent's signature.
f.

(R.366).

(R.366).

After receiving the signed note from Mr. Reeves, Mr.

Piatt prepared two separate pages of proposed changes to the
trust and delivered them to the decedent at the hospital for her
review as an intermediate step before preparing a restatement of
the entire trust.
g.

(R.366).

Mr. Piatt did not present these pages to the decedent
11

with the intention that she should sign or initial them, and at
no time did the decedent initial or sign these pages in Mr.
Piatt's presence.

Moreover, Mr. Piatt does not believe that he

himself ever notarized the document or authorized another in his
stead to notarize the document
his name.

notwithstanding the stamp bearing

Lending credence to Mr. Piatt's belief that he never

notarized the document is the fact that the amendment to the 1992
trust occurred in August of 1999, but Mr. Piatt' s supposed
affirmation of the decedent' s signature bears the date of the
1992 trust rather than the date when he supposedly witnessed the
decedent' s signature.
h.

(R.237, 366) .

At no time, notwithstanding Appellant' s representation

to the contrary, did Mr. Piatt ever prepare an entire trust
document for the decedent to sign; rather, Mr. Piatt simply
prepared separate pages of proposed amendments which would be
incorporated into a formal restatement of trust that he intended
to prepare at a later time.

The two pages that Mr. Piatt

prepared incorporated proposed changes to section 4.3
(distribution) and to section 6.6 (trustee).
Joseph Piatt, p.50.16-22.,
I.

(R.642).

Mr. Piatt never prepared a formal instrument revoking

the 1992 trust.
j.

Deposition of

(R.642).

The 1999 amendment to the 1992 trust, although

purporting to divest Appellees of their vested beneficial
interests, retains the exact language of the 1992 trust with
respect to Article I:
12

1.1 Purpose of the Trust. This Trust is established
for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the
Undersigned1 s lifetime, for the Undersigned' s family
thereafter. At the signing of this Trust, the Undersigned
is not married.
1.2

The family of the Undersigned consists of:
KENNETH ALAN BANKS, January 12, 193 8
SUSAN BANKS BAKER, March 20, 194 0
BRANSFORD MICHAEL BANKS, April 20, 1945

(R.227).
k.

At the time Mr. Piatt delivered the proposed amendments

to the decedent in the hospital, he was concerned about her
competency and whether she was free from undue influence.

(R.

366) .
1.

Mr. Piatt has called Mr. Reeves version of the events

"a complete fabrication."
22.

The decedent died fifteen days after Mr. Piatt visited her

in the hospital.
23.

(R.367).

(R.156).

During the course of the ensuing litigation, on or about

January 6 and 7, 2000, Appellees' counsel had occasion to depose
Appellant.

During that deposition, Appellees sought to pursue a

line of questioning relating to Appellant' s own estate
provisions.

Appellant objected and subsequently obtained a

protective order limiting that line of questioning to the plans
which Appellant had made prior to the decedent' s passing.
(R.84) .
24.

On or about March 9, 2000, the parties deposed attorney

Joseph Piatt.

During the course that deposition, Appellant's

counsel inquired of Mr. Piatt whether he had had any
conversations with Appellant recently.
13

Mr. Piatt responded:

No. I had one conversation with her several months ago. I
called her and asked her how she felt about all of this.
She is my client, also. And I wanted to make sure that she
was okay with what was happening. I wanted to make sure she
didn' t feel like Kevin was unduly influencing her. I
confirmed in my own mind whether she understood that if
Betty died Betty' s estate was now going to go to Nancy.
Nancy is going to die and Kevin is going to end up with that
I just wanted to make sure she understood that. (R.424).
25.

Appellant's counsel did not object to this answer and in

fact continued with a line of questioning that was designed to
elicit the responses to which Appellant now objects:
Q:

How do you know that occurred?

A:

Who do I--

Q:
How do you know that Mr. Reeves would end up with the
estate?
A:

Because Nancy told me.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly granted Appellees' motion for
summary judgment in this matter; notwithstanding questions of
fact that prevented the trial court from granting Appellant' s
motion, the trial court correctly concluded that even when
construing the questions of fact in the light most favorable to
Appellant, these questions of fact were immaterial to Appellees'
argument and Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
The 1992 trust, even though revocable and subject to
amendment, vested within Appellees a beneficial interest in the
decedent's estate.

This interest was not contingent.

Pursuant

to the explicit terms of the trust document, the vested
beneficial interest that Appellees enjoyed was subject to
14

divestiture only through a revocation of that trust.
The term revocation is not synonymous with either the term
modification or with the term amendment.

These terms are

technical terms under the law and should be afforded their
technical meanings.
Once a settlor creates a trust, even though that trust may
be revocable and subject to amendment, a settlor and trustee are
bound by the specific language of that trust and may not exercise
authority over the trust in a manner that is inconsistent with
the trust's explicit language.
In the present case, section 3.2 of the trust specifically
states that the interests of Appellees were vested interests
subject to divestiture only via a revocation of the trust.

Even

if the 1999 amendment to the 1992 trust was made while the
decedent was competent and free from undue influence, the 1999
amendment was not a revocation of that trust.

Therefore, the

1999 amendment was insufficient to divest Appellees of their
beneficial interests and Appellees are entitled to their
beneficial interests.
However, even if the Court finds that the Appellees'
beneficial interest was subject to divestiture via an amendment
or modification, this Court should remand this matter to the
trial court; not only is the denial of summary judgment not a
final order which can be appealed, there remain questions of
fact, as set forth above, surrounding the 1999 amendment that
prevent judgment from being entered in Appellant' s favor as a
15

matter of law.

As the non-moving party with respect to

Appellant' s motion, Appellees are entitled to have each question
of fact resolved in their favor, and it does not necessarily
follow that simply because both parties may have moved the trial
court for summary judgment that both parties concede that no
questions of fact exist under the theory of the case propounded
by the opposing party.
Finally, the trial court did not err in allowing the
statements made by attorney Joseph Piatt to be admitted in this
matter.

The statements made by Mr. Piatt were unrelated to Mr.

Piatt's previous representation of the Appellant, the Appellant
was not the personal representative of the decedent who could
claim the privilege under Rule 504® of the Utah Rules of Evidence
on the decedent' s behalf, and the Appellant waived any privilege
she may have otherwise claimed when her attorney' s own question
elicited the response to which Appellant now objects.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
Because the disposition of a case by summary judgment denies

the losing party the benefit of a trial on the merits, the
appellate court must review the evidence presented in the light
which is most favorable to that party and then affirm only when
it appears that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, or
where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

Themy v. Seagull Enters. Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).
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However, an appellate court may affirm a trial court' s order
granting summary judgment on any ground that was available to the
trial court even if it was not specifically relied upon by the
trial court.
1993).

Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 .2d 231 (Utah

In the present case, a material dispute exists as to the

validity of the 1999 amendment to the decedent's 1992 trust.
However, even when the Court resolves this dispute of fact in
Appellant' s favor, Appellees are still entitled to summary
judgment because the 1999 amendment is insufficient to divest
them of the beneficial interest that vested in them by operation
of the 1992 trust as a matter of law.
A.
EVEN IF VALID, THE 1999 AMENDMENT DOES NOT DIVEST
APPELLEES OF THE INTERESTS THAT THEY ACQUIRED VIA OPERATION
OF THE 1992 TRUST,
By its own terms, the 1992 trust was both revocable and
subject to amendment.

The primary purpose of this trust was to

provide for the decedent who simultaneously occupied the
positions of settlor, trustee and beneficiary.

Indeed, by the

terms of the trust, the decedent was the sole active beneficiary.
However, the 1992 trust also vested in Appellees a beneficial
interest that was subject to divestiture only by a revocation of
that trust.

That revocation never occurred.

Appellees are

therefore entitled to their beneficial interest set forth in the
1992 trust notwithstanding the validity of the 1999 amendment and
this Court should affirm the trial court' s order.
Even revocable trusts vest within the trust beneficiaries an
enforceable interest in the trust corpus.
17

Continental Bank v.

Country Club Mobile Est., 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981); Matter of
Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420 (Ariz. App. 1996).
"These interests cannot be taken from the beneficiaries except in
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument, or by their
own acts, or by a decree of a court."
citing,

Pilafas, supra,

George G. Bogart and George T. Bogart, Trusts

Trustees

§ 998 (2d. ed. Rev. 1983).

at 423,
and

Accordingly, the explicit

terms of the trust limit the power of both the settlor and the
trustee over the trust and this limitation remains even when the
settlor has appointed himself trustee for his own benefit.
Continental Bankf supra,

872; Pilafas, supra,

423; Kline v. Utah

Dept. of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1989); see also,
Estate of Brenner, 547 P.2d 938, 942 (Colo. App. 1976).
Therefore, absent fraud or mistake, neither of which has been
alleged surrounding the creation of the 1992 trust, a settlor has
the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the specific
extent that such a power was explicitly reserved by the terms of
the trust itself.
and Trustees,

Kline, supra,

61; Bogert and Bogert,

Trusts

§ 1001 (where a settlor reserves a power to revoke

the trust in a particular manner, he can revoke it only in that
manner).
In the present case, it is not disputed that had the
decedent reserved the power to terminate Appellees' interest in
the trust via an amendment to the trust rather than by a
revocation of the trust, she clearly could have done so.
However, she did not reserve this power.
18

Rather, she reserved

only the power to terminate Appellees interest in the 1992 trust
by a revocation of the trust.

And once the decedent divested

herself of the legal title to the trust corpus, the formalities
and terms of the trust document limited her authority to control
the trust corpus thereafter.

These formalities cannot be

abridged notwithstanding the powers of reservation which the
settlor could have made but did not make.
supra,

Continental Bank,

illustrates this point.
In Continental Bank, a settlor owned property subject to a

six year option to buy held by a third party.

Thereafter, the

settlor conveyed this property to a trustee to be held in trust
for various members of his family.

The settlor retained the

right to revoke and amend the trust but granted the trustee broad
authority to manage the trust.

The authority granted to the

trustee included the right to grant options.

Subsequent to

divesting himself of legal title, the settlor extended the third
party* s option to buy.

Shortly after the settlor' s death, and

after the expiration of the original option to buy, the third
party sought to exercise the second option leading the trustee to
initiate a quiet title action.

In holding that the settlor' s

extension of the option to buy was without legal effect, the
Court advocated a formalistic analysis rather than the intent
based approach advocated by the dissent: "once the settlor has
created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property
and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly
reserved to him in the trust instrument."
19

Ld., at 872 (citations

omitted).

Thus, the Court noted that even though the settlor

could have properly achieved the desired result by adhering to
the trust formalities--i.e., revoking the trust and then granting
the extension--the settlor' s failure to so adhere rendered his
extension void.
A formalistic analysis yields the same result in the present
case: even if valid, the decedent's failure to adhere to the
trust formalities renders the 1999 amendment ineffective to
divest Appellees of their beneficial interests.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the trust control this analysis.
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the
Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to
amend, modify or revoke this trust in whole or in part,
including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed
income from such principal. Such revocation or amendment of
this Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument.
Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument
shall be effective only when the change is delivered in
writing to the then acting Trustee. On the revocation of
this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver
to the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the
instrument of revocation, all of the trust property.
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of
the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to
divestment which shall continue until this trust is revoked
or terminated other by death. As long as this trust
subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by
the Trustee in their fiduciary capacity.
Section 3.1, governs the rights which the decedent retained over
the trust subsequent to divesting herself of legal title.
Section 3.2 outlines the rights which Appellees received by
virtue of the decedent's conveyance in trust.

In tandem, the two

provisions provide the formalistic framework that govern the
Court's analysis.
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Under section 3.1, the decedent, in her capacity as settlor,
reserved the right to amend, modify or revoke the trust.

Section

3.1 specifies, however, that such amendment, modification or
revocation would be effective only when such change was delivered
to the then acting trustee.
1992 unamended trust govern.

Until that time, the terms of the
Section 3.2 of the trust then

states that the rights which the Appellees received were
presently vested rights, and although these rights were subject
to divestiture, these rights were to continue until the trust was
revoked or terminated other than by death.

Thus, even though the

decedent, in her capacity as settlor, retained the right to
divest Appellees of their beneficial interests, her power to
effect such divestiture was limited by the trust1 s expressed
terms; and the trust specified that she could only accomplish
this end via a revocation of the trust.
Two brief asides are worth noting here.
retained the power to amend the trust.

First, the decedent

Thus, it is conceivable

that had she delivered in writing to the acting trustee an
amendment to the trust that permitted a divestiture of the
Appellees through amendment or modification, rather than
revocation, she could have done so.

However, there has been no

evidence presented to show that the decedent ever attempted such
amendment.

Second, the decedent, in her capacity as settlor,

granted to the trustee the authority to use both the trust income
and the trust principal for the decedent' s benefit as the sole
active beneficiary.

Obviously, to the extent that the trustee* s
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duties required her to invade the trust principal, the trustee
possessed a limited power to effect at least a partial revocation
of the trust.

Again, however, this issue is not before the Court

inasmuch as it is clear that the 1999 amendment was an action
made by the decedent in her capacity as settlor.
Leaving behind those two asides, it is clear that the two
single sheets which the decedent purportedly initialed were not a
revocation of the trust; rather they were merely an attempted
modification.

The terms amendment, modification and revocation

are not synonymous but are instead well-known technical terms.
Under the law, words with a well-known technical meaning should
be construed according to their technical meaning unless a
contrary meaning appears in the granting instrument.
Short, 7 S.W.3d (Mo. App. 1999).

In re

Black's Law Dictionary defines

the terms as follows:
Amend.
To improve. To change for the better by removing
defects or faults. To change, correct, revise.
Amendment.
To change or modify for the better.
by modification, deletion, or addition.

To alter

Modification. A change; an alteration or amendment which
introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of
them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the
subject matter intact.
Modify.
To alter; to change in incidental or subordinate
features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce. Such
alteration or change may be characterized, in quantitative
sense, as either an increase or decrease.
Revocation.
The withdrawal or recall of some power,
authority, or thing granted, or a destroying or making void
of some will, deed, or offer that had been valid until
revoked.
Revoke.

To annul or make void by recalling or taking back.
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To cancel, rescind, repeal, or reverse, as to revoke a
license or will. Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed. 1990).
Thus, while amendment and modification contemplate continuity of
the subject matter subsequent to a change, the term revocation
indicates a destruction of the subject matter altogether.
No contrary meanings to these definitions are present within
the trust.

In fact, the technical distinction is evident in the

explicit trust language.

Section 3.1 states: "On the revocation

of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to
the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument
of revocation, all of the Trust property."

In other words, upon

the revocation of the trust, the trust would cease to subsist and
the trustee was to restore to the settlor all of the property
which she held in trust, thereby extinguishing the relationship
between the parties.

No similar instruction accompanies the

reservation of power to modify or amend the trust.

The

implication is obvious; if the settlor chose to amend or modify
the trust the trust would continue to exist.
Viewed in this context, it is clear that the 1999 amendment
which purports to divest Appellees of their beneficial interests,
was not the type of event that contemplated the termination of
the trust in its entirety.

Rather, it was merely a change

incidental to the trust itself.

And under the trust' s own terms,

because Appellees' vested interest in the trust corpus were to
continue as long as the trust subsisted, it was insufficient to
divest Appellees of their interests.
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B.
APPELLANT' S ARGUMENTS IGNORE THE TRUST' S UNAMBIGUOUS
MEANING.
In her brief, Appellant sets forth five separate arguments
as to the trial court's misinterpretation of the 1992 trust.
Without exception these arguments ignore the trust' s plain and
unambiguous meaning.
First, Appellant argues that section 3.1 of the trust is the
controlling section "as to modifications of the Trust including
the creation and removal of contingent beneficial interests"
because section 3.2 merely recites a formality to ensure that the
trust is not illusory under the law.
15.

Brief of the Appellant, p.

In support of this proposition, Appellant recalls historical

cases which have held that revocable trusts were not illusory
because they created in the beneficiary a presently vested
interest which was to coincide with the trust itself.

Under the

Appellant's argument, because section 3.2 merely restates the
law, the Court should look to section 3.1 as the controlling
section.

Appellant cites In re Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d

1255 (Utah 1997) to bolster this point.

In that case, the Court

determined that the decedent' s revocable trust was not illusory
because vested interests were created at the trust' s inception.
The Court determined that simply because these interests were
subject to divestiture did not make the trust illusory.
In the present case, however, neither party contends that
the 1992 trust is illusory.

Groesbeck is therefore inapplicable

to the proposition which Appellant has set forth: that the Court
should ignore the plain language of section 3.2 in favor of
24

section 3.1.
It is axiomatic that when interpreting a contract a court
must construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary
meaning.

Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993).

Moreover, the contract should be read as a whole, in an attempt
to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions.
Nielsen v. 0' Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992).
position ignores this maxim.

Appellant's

Instead, Appellant' s argument

unnecessarily privileges section 3.1 over section 3.2 while
Appellees interpretation harmonizes and gives equal weight to
both: the decedent retained the right to amend and modify the
trust, but if the decedent wished to divest the beneficiaries of
their vested rights, she was required to revoke the trust.
Moreover, only Appellees position may be read in harmony with
Article I of the trust which states that the purpose of the
trust, after providing for the decedent during her lifetime, was
to provide for Appellees.
Appellant' s first argument belies her second in which she
posits that section 3.2 actually means that the interests of the
beneficiaries were subject to divestiture via amendment and
revocation.

In submitting that claim, Appellant attempts to

parse the language of section 3.2 by dividing modifying phrases
to arrive at what is apparently a contradictory conclusion with
the position that she advances.

Without attempting to recreate

Appellant' s somewhat confusing method, the correct interpretation
of section 3.2 is as follows: Section 3.2, by its plain language,
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defines the rights which the beneficiaries received by the
creation of the trust.

The term of art which described this

right is a presently vested beneficial interest which was subject
to being divested.

Section 3.2 then specifies that this right

was to continue for as long as the trust remained in effect.
Thus, as long as the trust existed, the Appellees interest in the
trust existed as well.
Appellant1 s confusion apparently stems from the phrase
"subject to divestment" which she mistakenly separates from the
phrase "presently vested interests" rather than reading them
together as a whole to describe the interest that Appellees
received.

The Groesbeck case, supra,

from which Appellant

herself quotes illustrates this error.

Appellant has previously

noted the similarities between the language in the Groesbeck
trust and the 1992 trust executed by the decedent.
Appellant, p. 14.

Brief of the

In fact, section 3.2 is nearly identical to

Article VI C of the Groesbeck trust.

Article VI C of the

Groesbeck trust states: "The interests of the beneficiaries is a
present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked
or terminated other than by death."

Thus, the only difference

with respect to the two sections is that the 1992 trust gives a
more detailed description to what the Groesbeck trust simply
calls a "present interest."

Appellant is therefore incorrect

when she separates the phrase "subject to divestment" from the
phrase "presently vested interests" to derive the significance
that she propounds in her brief.
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Appellant* s third argument is merely the conclusory
statement that the trial court's interpretation of section 3.2
stripped section 3.1 of its meaning with respect to partial
revocations.
however.

Appellant offers no support for this proposition,

Therefore, Appellees respectfully request this Court,

pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
disregard this portion of Appellant's brief.

See also, Burns v.

Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 1997) (where appellant failed
to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support
of his claims, his assertions did not permit appellate review).
To the extent, however, that Appellant' s third argument merely
restates arguments presented elsewhere, Appellees respectfully
refer the Court to those areas of this brief.
Appellant' s fourth argument, to a certain degree, develops
the argument which Appellant failed to support in her third: the
decedent retained the right to effect partial as well as total
revocations of the trust.

If evidence exists, and Appellant

claims it does, that indicates the decedent effected a partial
revocation of the trust then that partial revocation is
sufficient to divest Appellees of their vested interests.

This

argument fails as a matter of law.
Appellees do not dispute that the decedent retained the
right to partially revoke the trust.

Instead, Appellees dispute

that a partial revocation, even if so effected, would have the
legal consequence that Appellant asserts.

As set forth above,

the decedent had at her disposal two methods of effecting a
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partial revocation: First, as the settlor, and in compliance with
the instructions set forth in section 3.1, the decedent clearly
could have withdrawn certain property from the trust corpus.
Once the settlor withdrew this property from the trust, neither
the trustee nor the beneficiaries would have any legal
relationship or claim to this property.

Second, as the trustee,

and in compliance with section 2.1 of the trust, the decedent
could have determined that the property was required to meet the
decedent' s needs in her capacity as the active beneficiary of the
trust.

Again, once this property was removed from the trust,

neither the trustee nor the beneficiaries would have standing to
claim an interest in that property.

In both cases, however,

notwithstanding the partial revocation, the underlying trust
would continue to subsist and the relationships defined by that
trust would continue with respect to the property left
undisturbed.

See, Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354

(Utah 1997).
Notwithstanding the language that Appellant uses to phrase
her argument, Appellant is not claiming that either the settlor
or the trustee removed property from the trust.

Therefore,

Plaintiff's fourth argument, at its essence, is unrelated to the
issue of whether a partial revocation could effect Appellees'
divestiture.

Instead, Appellant is arguing that the Court need

not be troubled with trust formalities and that the decedent' s
alleged amendment should be sufficient to divest Appellees
notwithstanding the plain language of section 3.2 because the
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decedent also retained the right to revoke the trust.
In support of this position, Appellant cites authorities
which are largely inapplicable to the facts before the Court:
Scott

on Trusts,

§ 331.1 (3d ed. 1967) and In re Schautz, 151

A.2d 457 (Penn. 1959).

These authorities stand for the

proposition that where a settlor reserved the power to revoke the
trust, the settlor' s power to also amend the trust would be
inferred even if the settlor failed to explicitly reserve such
power.

Thus, a settlor could properly amend the trust without

first revoking the trust.

In the present case, however, the

decedent clearly reserved the power to modify the trust and
distinguished this power from the power to revoke the trust.
Moreover, unlike the situations set forth in the authorities
cited by Appellant, the decedent specifically stated that the
interests which Appellees enjoyed were to co-exist with the trust
during the trust's subsistence.

Thus, even were the Court

generally inclined to interpret Appellant' s authorities as
removing the formalistic barrier which required revocation before
amendment, that interpretation would have no bearing on the
present case; to give effect to this trust' s plain language, the
Court can only find that Appellees' interest were subject to
divestment only via a revocation of the trust.
An aside relevant to this point: Appellant has previously
set forth that trust provisions such as section 3.2 find their
genesis in law discussing the legal effect of revocable inter
vivos trusts.

The implication of this statement is that section
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3.2 is merely a formal necessity that prevents the trust from
being illusory rather than a statement that reflects the
settlor's intent.

The connotation is that section 3.2's literal

reading should be subordinated to other sections, particularly
section 3.1.

However, neither the implication nor the

connotation accurately reflects the law concerning trusts;
section 3.2 was simply not needed to prevent the trust from being
illusory under the law.
In Sundguist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1981),
the Court, in giving effect to an undocumented trust,
specifically stated: "The settlor need not sign a formal trust
instrument or employ any particular form of words."

Rather, a

settlor need only have a present intent to create a presently
enforceable trust, have property set aside, and then specify the
essential terms of a trust in such manner that a court could
enforce the duties which comprise the sine qua non of the trust.
Id. at 184.

In the present case, the application of this finding

defeats both Appellant' s implication and its accompanying
connotation: even were 3.2 absent from the trust, the trust would
still have been enforceable under the law.

Section 3.2 was

simply not required merely as a formal necessity to prevent the
trust from being illusory.

In fact it was not required at all.

Therefore, its inclusion cannot merely be dismissed as a
formality rather than a statement of intent.

Thus, section 3.2

should be afforded status equal to other provisions in the trust
and read so as to give full effect to its plain language.
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Homer

v. Smith, supra;

Nielsen v. O' Reilly, supra.

When section 3.2 is

interpreted in this manner, the only interpretation which gives
equal weight to this provision

is the reading which finds that

the rights of the Appellees were subject to divestment only
through a revocation of the trust.
Appellant's fifth argument is also unpersuasive.

Under this

theory, section 3.2 of the trust refers not to Appellees but only
to the decedent inasmuch as she was the only active beneficiary
of the trust.
supra,

Although Appellant cites Matter of Estate of West,

in support of this proposition, this argument may be

disposed of simply by referencing the trust document itself.
Under the terms of the 1992 trust, the term beneficiaries clearly
refers to all persons who could claim a beneficial interest under
the trust: in this case the decedent and the Appellees.

First,

the term beneficiaries is the plural of the term beneficiary.

If

the Court construes this plural noun according to its plain
meaning, the Court must conclude that section 3.2 applies to more
than one beneficiary.

Aside from the Appellees and the decedent,

no other persons are mentioned in the trust.

Therefore, the

Court must conclude that the settlor intended section 3.2 to
govern the interests of both the decedent and the Appellees.
Second, the settlor, when referring only to the decedent' s
beneficial interest elsewhere in the trust, does not refer to the
decedent as the beneficiary.

Rather, she is referred to as the

Undersigned, a term which is also used to occasionally, and
confusingly, designate the settlor.
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For example, in section 2.1,

the trustee is authorized to make payments for the benefit and
maintenance of the Undersigned.

Section 2.1 does not use the

term beneficiary at any time, but obviously, a trustee holds
legal title to property to be used only for the benefit of the
beneficiary as opposed to the settlor, who has divested himself
of both legal and beneficial title.

Thus, when section 3.2

authorizes payment by the trustee to the Undersigned, the
Undersigned is clearly a beneficiary of the trust.
Finally, Matter of Estate of West simply does not stand for
the proposition which Appellant asserts.

The West case stands

for the proposition that a sole surviving trustee who is also the
trust1 s sole active beneficiary may exercise by himself all of
the powers which he could have exercised jointly with a cotrustee, and that he could do so without breaching an owed
fiduciary duty to beneficiaries who were subject to divestiture.
Nowhere in the West opinion does the Court state that
beneficiaries subject to divestiture are not beneficiaries.
Rather, it states that these beneficiaries could not assert a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty since their rights had not
ripened at that point.

Thus, Appellant's fifth argument must

fail as a matter of law and the Court should find that section
3.2 applies to Appellees as well as the decedent.
Appellant' s sixth argument is a policy argument which is
simply not well reasoned.

Appellant contends that under the

trial court' s ruling, a settlor of a revocable trust subject to
amendment could only divest beneficiaries via a revocation of the
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trust in its entirety.
no such implication.

In fact, the trial court' s ruling carries
Rather, the trial court' s ruling has no

implication beyond the present case other than to ensure that
full weight and effect are given to a trust' s explicit terms.
This is already the law in Utah.

The only beneficiaries who

could not be divested of their interests via an amendment to the
trust, would be those beneficiaries whose interests under the
trust' s plain language were to continue until the trust was
revoked.

The Court should therefore affirm the trial court' s

order granting summary judgment.
C.
THE COURT MAY FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 1999
AMENDMENT FAILS AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE 1992 TRUST,
Although not relied on specifically by the trial court
below, this Court may find that the 1999 amendment to the 1992
trust fails as a matter of law and affirm the trial court' s order
granting summary judgment to Appellees.

An appellate court may

affirm a trial court' s order granting summary judgment on any
ground that was available to the trial court even if it was not
specifically relied upon by the court below.
Lake County, supra.

Higgins v. Salt

This issue was presented to the trial court

on pages 18 and 19 of the Appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and is preserved by the
record on pages 375 and 376.
In 1996, the Washington Court of Appeals handed down a
decision in a case remarkably similar to the case before the
Court today: In re Tosh, 920 P.2d 1230 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1996).
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If this Court were to adopt the standard promulgated by the
Washington court, this Court could determine as a matter of law
that even if the decedent actually intended to amend the 1992
trust by inserting two pages of proposed amendments into the
existing 1992 trust, that such amendment was invalid and
therefore insufficient to vest in Appellant any enforceable
interest in the 1992 trust corpus.
In the Tosh case, a settlor created an original revocable
trust in which he gave his companion a life estate in a duplex
with the remainder split between his two daughters.

Thereafter,

he consulted an attorney for the express purpose of amending his
trust to leave the duplex to his companion outright.

In

preparing the amendment, the attorney simply substituted one page
of the trust for another without preparing a new trust agreement
that incorporated the proposed amendment.

Upon the settlor's

death, the daughters contested the validity of the amended trust.
In handing down it decision, the Washington court first
commented that the record undoubtedly reflected the settlor' s
intent and belief as to the validity of the amended trust.
Nevertheless, the court determined that a trustor who merely
substituted an amended page into an already existing trust had
not met the formal procedural requirements for amending the trust
and the court therefore invalidated the amendment.

As the court

stated: "Clear evidence of both intent and belief cannot
substitute for actually, or substantially, doing what is
required."

id. at 1233.
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In the present case, the facts are similar.

However, in

this case the two pages of purported amendments were not inserted
into the original documents, but into an unexecuted photocopy of
the 1992 will and trust that Mr. Reeves received at some point in
time subsequent to the preparation of the purported amendments.
To be candid, questions of fact abound with respect to the
circumstances surrounding the 1999 amendment, with both Mr.
Reeves and Mr. Piatt giving remarkably different accounts of the
events.

However, regardless of how these questions of fact are

resolved, it is not disputed that Mr. Piatt only prepared two
pages of proposed amendments which were subsequently inserted
into a blank copy of the 1992 trust.

Given the decision in Tosh,

which is entirely in harmony with the Court* s decision in
Continental Bank, this Court can clearly find that the alleged
1999 amendment did not meet the procedural requirements needed to
validly effect an amendment to the 1992 trust in accordance with
the provisions set forth in section 3.1 regarding amendment,
modification and revocation.

Therefore, since Appellant' s entire

claim hinges on the validity of the 1999 amendment, the Court can
properly affirm the trial court' s order granting Appellees
summary j udgment.
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT QUESTIONS OF FACT
PREVENTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM BEING ENTERED FOR APPELLANT.
Cross-motions for summary judgment are most properly viewed
as the independent contention by both parties that they are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law rather than a
concession that no question of fact exists under the theory
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advanced by the opposing party.

Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 78 0

P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
appealable.

Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385

(Utah 1968) . However, if the Court determines that Appellant can
properly appeal the trial court' s finding that questions of fact
existed with respect to Appellant' s theory of the case, then
Appellees become the nonmoving party.

As the nonmoving party,

Appellees are entitled to have all evidence construed by this
Court in the light most favorable to their position,

Themy v.

Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979), with some
deference being accorded to the trial court' s application of law
to fact.

Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App.

1994) . With respect to Appellant' s motion, the reasonable
inferences drawn from the facts at bar demonstrate that material
issues exist which may only be resolved by a trier of fact.
A.

THE PRESENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IS A QUESTION OF FACT,

Whether an undue influence contributed to the purported
amendment of the 1992 trust is a question of fact that may only
be resolved by analyzing the relationships between the decedent,
the Appellant and Mr. Reeves to determine whether a confidential
relationship existed which may have unduly affected the
decedent's decision to amend her trust.

U

A confidential

relationship arises when one party, after having gained the trust
and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over
the other party.

If a confidential relationship exists between
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two parties to a transaction, and if the superior party (in whom
the trust has been reposed) benefits from the transaction, a
presumption of undue influence is raised."

Estate of Jones v.

Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).

The

existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact.
Id.
In the matter at bar, Appellees' case does not suffer from
the failure of proof contemplated by Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

To the contrary, Appellees have not only

demonstrated that genuine issues of fact exist, Appellees have
raised issues upon which a trier of fact could reasonably find in
their favor.

This presentation of fact precludes entry of

summary judgment in Appellant* s favor.
Specifically, Appellees have called into question the
circumstances preceding the decedent's amendment of trust.
set forth in the Statement of Fact, supra,

As

and as amply

demonstrated below, Appellees have cast doubt on Appellant' s
version of these facts, which Mr. Piatt has called M a complete
fabrication."

(R.370).

For example, Appellee has shown that but

for the interference of Kevin Reeves in the decedent' s personal
affairs, the 1992 trust would have remained unaltered.
of Fact HH 14-21.

Statement

Additionally, by Kevin Reeves' own testimony,

he had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with the
decedent.

Deposition of Kevin Reeves, p. 18.12-19, p. 20.11-18.

Appellant concedes this fact.

Moreover, as the Appellant's

beneficiary, Mr. Reeves stood to gain from any amendment of trust
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which benefitted Appellant.

When these facts are construed in

the light most favorable to Appellees' position, it is clear that
a presumption of undue influence has been raised which would
invalidate the 1999 amendment, particularly in light of Mr.
Piatt's pronouncement.
Moreover, Appellees have presented evidence that can be
construed as evidence that the decedent in fact attempted to
resist Mr. Reeves' undue influence.

In early 1999, Mr. Reeves

began inquiring as to the state of the decedent' s personal
affairs.

(R.361).

In response to these inquiries, the decedent

gave answers which can be construed as being intentionally
misleading in order to keep her affairs private: she told Mr.
Reeves, untruthfully, that the Appellant was her beneficiary.
(R.369).

At substantially the same time that she was

misrepresenting her affairs to Mr. Reeves, the decedent gave her
daughter the original copy of the 1992 trust and the accompanying
will along with the instruction that the daughter would need
those documents upon the decedent's passing.

(R.364).

This fact

can be construed as the effort by the decedent to keep her
affairs secret from the Appellant and Mr. Reeves, and to
guarantee that her true intent with respect to her estate would
remain uncompromised.
This reasonable inference gains credence in light of the
Appellant' s own testimony: Appellant testified that the decedent
had always told her that she was the decedent' s beneficiary.
(R.369).

If this testimony is true, then the decedent must have
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known that any discovery of her trust would expose the fact that
she had always misrepresented the true state of her affairs.

It

also creates the reasonable inference that the decedent must have
known that were the documents discovered, she would be compelled
to alter the documents, especially in light of the testimony that
the decedent had a history of conceding to the Appellant.
(R.370).

In fact, this is precisely what happened.

After

keeping her affairs private for seven years, and notwithstanding
the decedent1 s own efforts to conceal her true plans, Mr. Reeves
obtained a copy of the decedent' s trust and the decedent was
compelled to make the modifications.
B,
QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER MS. BANKS WAS
COMPETENT TO EXECUTE A TRUST,
Appellees are entitled to have all reasonable inferences
surrounding questions of fact regarding the decedent' s competency
drawn in their favor.

The standard for determining requisite

competency with respect to the execution of a trust is a higher
standard than mere testamentary capacity and is, in fact, the
identical standard required as to all contracts.
loupe, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 1994).

Estate of

Thus, the test for

competency is not whether the settlor was generally of a sound
mind but whether the settlor had the power to comprehend the
subject of the trust, its nature and its probable consequences.
Walker v. U.S. General, Inc., 916 P.2d 903 (Utah 1996); Hilbert
v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Restatement 2d,
Trusts §§ 19, 333).

In the instant case, in light of this

standard, sufficient questions of fact exist to allow Appellees'
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case to survive summary judgment.
The decedent's competency affects two areas of this case:
first, whether she was competent as the trust1 s settlor to effect
a valid amendment of the trust, and second, whether she was
competent as the trustee to receive the amendment.

In the trial

court, Appellees presented evidence which tended to show that the
decedent' s competency was in fact diminished with respect to both
roles.

First, Appellees presented evidence that during her final

weeks, the decedent became forgetful and repetitive in her
conversations with her children.

(R.372).

In fact, Mr. Reeves

testified that the decedent told him that she had lost her trust
documents when she had, in fact, given them to her daughter.
(R.372).

Second, Mr. Reeves has stated that Ms. Banks did not

understand the trust language when he read it to her and that he
had to explain it in very simple terms.

(R.372).

Third, both

Mr. Reeves and Appellant have testified that the decedent stated
that she believed that Appellant was the original beneficiary of
her trust.

(R.372).

If the decedent made this statement, and if, as Mr. Reeves
testified, the decedent didn1 t understand the trust language when
he read it to her, two reasonable inferences arise.

First, if

the decedent could not understand the original trust there is no
reason to assume that she understood the amended trust.
Second, if she didn' t understand the trust and was unaware of the
identity of the beneficiary, she would be incapable of
discharging her duties as the trustee.
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If she were incapable,

then she would be unable to accept delivery of the amendment
under section 3.1.

In any event, these facts give rise to

inferences which can only be settled by a trier of fact.
C.
ONLY COMPLETE AND UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS MAY BE
INTERPRETED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Only when contract terms are complete, clear and unambiguous
can they be interpreted as a matter of law.

If the terms of a

contract are in conflict, the party' s intent may only be derived
by resort to extrinsic evidence.

Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen

Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

The instant case

presents neither a complete nor facially unambiguous document.
Therefore, contrary to assertions advanced by Appellant, the 1999
amendment may not be interpreted as a matter of law.
Unlike the 1992 trust, the 1999 amendment is incomplete and
facially ambiguous.

First, as set forth above, the 1999

amendment is nothing but two pages of proposed changes which were
inserted into a blank copy of the 1992 trust.

Second, axiomatic

rules of construction, set forth above in Homer v. Smith and
Neilsen v. 0' Reilly, reveal the amendment's ambiguity: Article I,
which states that the purpose of the trust was to benefit
Appellees, cannot be reconciled with section 4.3 of the amended
trust which states that Appellant was the beneficiary.

Absent

resort to extrinsic evidence, it is impossible to harmonize the
two provisions and at the same time afford the provisions the
meaning of their plain language.

Therefore, this document may

not be interpreted as a matter of law.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE STATEMENTS MADE BY
ATTORNEY JOSEPH PLATT.
Whether the trial court correctly determined that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to the deposed statements
of Mr. Piatt is a mixed question of law and fact.

The legal

conclusions of the trial court are reviewed for correctness while
some deference will be accorded the trial court' s application of
law to fact.

Montes Family v. Carter,

supra.

Citing to Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Appellant
argues that the deposed statements given by attorney Joseph Piatt
which concerned Mr. Reeves' beneficial status were improperly
admitted by the trial court because they did not fall within any
of the five listed exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.
Appellant* s analysis, however, has little bearing on the facts
before the court; attorney Piatt did not divulge any information
that he acquired during his representation of Appellant, and even
if the privilege did apply, Appellant waived the privilege by
failing to protect it.
A.
THE INFORMATION DIVULGED BY MR. PLATT WAS NOT
DISCOVERED INCIDENTAL TO AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-8(2) states at relevant part: "An
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice
given regarding the communication in the course of his
professional employment."

In the instant case, because Appellant

has not established that Mr. Piatt divulged any information that
he acquired during the course of his professional of her,
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Appellant cannot assert this privilege.
This Court has commented previously on the attorney-client
privilege and noted that "since the privilege has the effect of
withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies
only where necessary to achieve its purpose.

Accordingly, it

protects only those disclosures--necessary to obtain informed
legal advice--which might not have been made absent the
privilege."

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resource

Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted).

Thus,

"the privilege should be strictly construed with its object."
Id.

Although the Court stated that each case must be considered

individually to determine whether the privilege applies, the
Court did find two specific instances in which the privilege
would be upheld: "1) for the purpose of forming an opinion as to
the legality of a contemplated legal action, or 2) for legal
analysis and advice as to the particular prospective litigation."
Id. at 913.
Neither of these two instances reflects the facts before the
Court and applied to the present case, this standard favors the
admission of Mr. Piatt' s statements.

Appellant was not seeking

Mr. Piatt' s legal advice when she informed him that Mr. Reeves
was the beneficiary of her trust.
about potential litigation.

Nor was she seeking advice

There is no evidence to suggest that

Mr. Piatt prepared the trust which gave Mr. Reeves that
beneficial status.

And there is no evidence to suggest that Mr.

Piatt' s representation of the Appellant extended beyond preparing
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a trust for Appellant in 1992 which had by that time been revoked
by Appellant.

Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's

order with respect to Mr. Piatt's statement.
B.
APPELLANT WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE WHEN HER OWN ATTORNEY' S
QUESTIONS ELICITED THE RESPONSE.
Noticeably absent from Appellant' s brief is any reference to
the fact that the responses given by Mr. Piatt to which Appellant
now objects were in response to a series of questions posed by
her own attorney.

Even if the privilege had otherwise applied,

its divulgence under these facts constitutes a waiver of the
privilege under Rule 507(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 507 (a) states:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against
the disclosure of the confidential matter or communication
waives the privilege if the person...voluntarily discloses
or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the
matter or communication, or fails to take reasonable
precautions against inadvertent disclosure.
The Advisory Committee Note, subparagraph (a) then states: "Since
the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some
societal interest or confidential relationship, the privilege
should end when the purpose is no longer served because the
holder has allowed some disclosure or made disclosure."
In the instant case, Appellant allowed the disclosure to
which she now objects.

Her own attorney phrased three

consecutive questions which were designed to elicit the
responses.

Significantly, it should be noted that because Mr.

Bullock did in fact ask three questions, that Rule 507(b)(2)
should not apply.

This simply is not a case where Mr. Piatt made
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the disclosure before Appellant could assert the privilege.
Rather, Mr. Piatt answered a question posed to him by Appellant' s
counsel.

Upon Mr. Piatt's answer, Appellant's counsel, rather

than asserting any privilege, then asked two consecutive
questions designed to clarify Mr. Piatt's response.

Thus, under

Rule 507(a), even if the privilege had otherwise applied
Appellant waived the right to assert this privilege.

Thus, the

trial court' s order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above, Appellees respectfully request
this Court to affirm the trial court' s order granting them
summary judgment; the terms of the 1992 trust are clear and
unambiguous.

By interpreting that trust as the trial court did,

the trial court gave full weight and effect to each of the
trust's explicit terms.

Alternatively, this Court can conclude

that the 1999 amendment fails as a matter of law.
However, even if this Court determines that the trial court
erred in interpreting the 1992 trust, this Court should refrain
from granting Appellant's motion for summary judgment; not only
is the 1999 amendment an incomplete and ambiguous document,
questions of fact abound as to whether the decedent executed the
1999 amendment while she remained free from undue influence or
while she was mentally competent either to make or receive such
amendment.
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court' s order
admitting statements made by Mr. Piatt; the information divulged
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by Mr. Piatt was not acquired incidental to an attorney-client
relationship and was only divulged pursuant to questions asked by
Appellant's own counsel.
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